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G
enerally speaking, the more you
pay for security, the more you
get. However, security services
also suffer from the law of
diminishing returns. At some
point, the costs of using the next feature-
rich component outweigh the benefits
you gain. The transition from worth-
while benefit to mere financial sink
occurs at different points on the security
continuum depending on the particular
environment and application. 
In environments where security is
paramount, such as banking or military
applications, the cost scales can be more
heavily loaded before they tip the bal-
ance. In contrast, public administrations
usually have more limited cash reserves,
and they may have to forego most of the
nice-to-have security bells and whistles. 
The public healthcare sector presents
an interesting dichotomy that emphasizes
this dilemma. The security of patient-spe-
cific data is paramount, yet the public
healthcare sector is chronically short of
cash. Concerns about security have con-
tributed to the healthcare sector’s great
reluctance to transfer patient-specific data
between primary and secondary care-
givers across the Internet. 
The X.509-based public-key infra-
structure may finally provide a safe, cost-
effective way of transferring this confi-
dential data. PKIs have a huge potential
for reducing healthcare operating costs
and waiting lists as well as having a pos-
itive impact on the quality of care. For
example, PKIs facilitate the electronic
transfer of confidential information such
as referral letters, patient records, pre-
scriptions, and high-resolution digital
images of skin or eye disease. 
Traditionally, Internet clients have
stored users’ private keys in software files
encrypted with a user-chosen password.
However, TrustHealth 2—a research and
development project that has been imple-
menting PKIs in various healthcare appli-
cations throughout Europe for nearly
two years—chose to store users’ private
keys in smart cards. Using a password or
PIN number protects smart cards, which
are generally regarded as being more
secure than encrypted software files.
SMART CARD ADVANTAGES 
The benefits of using a smart card as
opposed to a software token include 
• increased security, 
• potential user mobility, and 
• sequential access to one machine by
multiple users.
Two factors contribute to the in-
creased security of smart cards. First,
there is a decreased possibility of copy-
ing the smart card’s private key because
it never leaves the card. The smart card
uses its on-board CPU to compute the
transmitted data’s digital signature. In
contrast, with a software-based token,
the computer decrypts the private key
and holds it in memory while the CPU
processes it. 
Second, it’s easier to copy a software-
based token and to try to break the
password at leisure without the user’s
knowledge. Fraudulent use of the smart
card’s private key is less likely because
the attacker has to both steal the card
and know the user’s password or PIN.
Guessing a card’s password is usually
fruitless because most cards use their
on-board CPU to lock up after several
wrong guesses. 
Using a strong password to protect the
software-based token significantly dimin-
ishes this second threat. It’s almost
impossible to break a 16-character pass-
word. For example, a short eight-char-
acter mixed-case and alphanumeric
nonsense word or phrase gives 628 com-
binations (2.2 × 1014), which is equiva-
lent to 48-bit encryption. A 16-character
password is equivalent to 95-bit encryp-
tion.
SMART CARD DISADVANTAGES 
A smart card-based system doesn’t
automatically allow user mobility. User
mobility is only possible if every machine
that the user accesses has a smart card
reader attached. The machine must sup-
port the same standard smart card reader
interfaces or use the same proprietary
smart card reader. Similarly, to use the
same machine sequentially, multiple
users must all use the same smart card
technology.
In addition, smart card technology
can be expensive. For example, the base
price for a simple smart card reader is
$25 (and significantly more if it has
built-in security features such as key-
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pads), a PCMCIA-reader can cost up to
$250, and the interface software requires
an additional expenditure. The cards
themselves cost between $10 and $30
each. Our supplier charges more than
$100 for the software license fee for each
smart card. While these costs should
decrease with time, the initial investment
in smart card technology can still cost
more than $100,000 for an organization
such as a hospital that has several thou-
sand employees. This kind of expense
can be prohibitive for healthcare orga-
nizations that are already dealing with
scarce financial resources.
Some smart card implementations
have slower performance than software-
based tokens in current Pentium-based
PCs, both during initial loading when a
user logs on and during message signing
and encryption. We found that cards
were typically 5 to 100 percent slower
during message signing and encryption,
but they were up to an order of magni-
tude slower in the worst cases.
Because card implementations are rel-
atively new, they are more buggy and
rough around the edges than most other
software. For example, the PKI smart
card interface we use doesn’t recognize a
PCMCIA smart card reader if you
dynamically remove and reinsert it (even
after releasing the port). Instead, you
have to reboot the laptop each time. It
isn’t always possible to freely move smart
cards between machines unless the con-
figurations are identical, and even then it
can be a complex operation.
The equipment’s physical limitations
can include a shortage of slots (either
PCMCIA or IRQs) for attaching the
card to the PC. In addition, smart cards
have a limited storage capacity. One
smart card that we tried would only
allow a single key update before its
memory was used up, and then we had
to use another card. In contrast, soft-
ware-based tokens allow an unlimited
number of key updates.
WHEN THE DISADVANTAGES
OUTWEIGH THE BENEFITS
If users work primarily from their own
PCs, there are few (if any) benefits to
using a smart card instead of a software-
based token, while there are still all of the
disadvantages. Because the PC only con-
tains the one software token, there is no
possibility of mixing it up with another
token or of someone inadvertently tak-
ing the wrong token. The PC remains
fairly secure unless an attacker gains
physical access and steals a copy of the
token before trying to break the pass-
word—assuming, of course, that this PC
isn’t permanently connected to a net-
work. In the healthcare sector, practice
nurses, consultants, and general practi-
tioners often have their own PCs.
Even if you use several PCs—for
example, a home PC, a laptop, and an
office PC—using a smart card has fewer
benefits than you might at first expect.
You can easily copy the software token
for use on any one of the PCs. The only
minor inconvenience occurs if you
update the software token for some rea-
son. Then you must remember to manu-
ally copy the updated token to each
machine to synchronize them.
If users who can be trusted not to tam-
per with each other’s tokens share an
office PC, there is no significant addi-
tional benefit to using smart cards.
Several users, for example in a general
surgery practice, can share a PC that
holds all their software tokens, and each
user can select his or her own token prior
to logging on to the security application. 
Smart cards are beneficial in somescenarios, but they are not the secu-rity panacea that some people
believe them to be. In some user envi-
ronments, the costs and inconveniences
clearly outweigh the potential benefits of
using smart cards. ❖
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• Information about the TrustHealth 2 project: http://www.spri.se/th2/default.
htm 
• Web site for Entrust Technologies Inc.: http://www.entrust.com
• An overview of ICE-CAR, a European project that promotes the use of pub-
lic key infrastructures (PKIs): http://ice-car.darmstadt.gmd.de/
• ITU-T X.509: http://www-library.itsi.disa.mil/org/ituccitt/x_509.html 
• The basic concepts of the Public Key Authentication Framework: http://www.
ozemail.com.au/~firstpr/crypto/pkaftute.htm
Smart card information 
• Answers to FAQs about medical smart cards from Health Card Technologies:
http://www.hct.com/faq.htm
• A list of smart card resources from the Center for Instructional Technology:
http://www.unc.edu/cit/guides/irg-35.html
• Smart card market statistics: http://www.cardshow.com/statistics/uk/
philips.html
• An overview of the potential for using smart cards in the US: “Smart cards:
The ultimate plastic”; http://www.businessweek.com/1997/20/b3527107.htm
